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Abstract: This article looks back in history to understand how private debt developed into the kind 
of tradeable asset, or commodity, that it is today. The article theorises that development, 
distinguishing in it three discrete but overlapping modes of commodification, namely 
propertification, impersonalisation and risk abstraction. The three modes shed light on changes in 
debt as a legal institution and in the economic and social functions of debt. Finally, the article 
shows that commodification of private debt is not just a phenomenon of the past, but something to 
be taken into account in future law-making, where the three modes of commodification may help to 
recognise particular opportunities and risks. This is illustrated by two actions included in the 
Commission’s Capital Markets Union project, one regarding cross-border assignments of claims, 
the other the European securitisation market. 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
For contemporary market economies, debt is a tradeable asset, something capable of being sold and 
bought in different forms. In effect, debt has become a commodity. For proof, one only needs to 
think of the prevalence of financing techniques based on assignment of receivables (i.e. rights to 
payment of a monetary sum, a subset of ‘claims’), such as factoring and securitisation.1 A closely 
related matter is that debt is generally regarded as a type of intangible property.2 In notions of debt 
as a commodity or property, debt is viewed from the creditor side, as receivables or claims. 
 
                                                             
* Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki, Faculty of Law. Availability of web references checked on 1 
December 2016. I thank Dr Orkun Akseli for helpful comments on the first draft of this article, and Professor Agustín 
José Menéndez for thorough review. The article is a product of the project ‘European Bonds: The Moral Economy of 
Debt’, funded by the Academy of Finland and the University of Helsinki. 
1 Factoring generally means conversion of trade receivables (‘invoices’) into cash by selling them to a finance company, 
called a ‘factor’. Securitisation involves pooling together of receivables from mortgages or other loans and refinancing 
that pool, usually by selling it to a specially established company or other entity, called a ‘special purpose vehicle’ or 
‘SPV’, which finances the purchase by issuing debt securities backed by the pool (i.e. the income stream generated by 
the receivables), to be bought by investors in capital markets. See United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law, UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (United Nations, 2010), Introduction, at paras. 31–37, 
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security-lg/e/09-82670_Ebook-Guide_09-04-10English.pdf. The 
concept of assignment may cover, besides outright transfers of claims, transfers of claims by way of security, and 
(other) security rights over claims. See Article 14 para. 3 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L of 4 July 2008, 6–
16. 
2 See C. Lebon, ‘Property Rights in Respect of Claims’, in S. (J.H.M.) van Erp and B. Akkermans (eds.), Cases, 
Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Property Law (Hart Publishing, 2012), 365–423; A. 
Flessner and H. Verhagen, Assignment in European Private International Law: Claims as property and the European 
Commission’s ‘Rome I Proposal’ (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2006), at 2–7. 
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The notion of debt as a commodity is essential background to several other themes in this special 
issue. Today’s networks of debt could not have developed without extensive and in part excessive 
trading in debt, including in the shape of highly engineered financial products.3 Without those 
networks, and the resulting interdependences between individuals, enterprises and states, we would 
have less reason to inquire into the European community of debt. More generally, the commodity 
nature of debt must be recognised as a central precondition for financialisation.4 Importantly, 
though, the origins of current commercial and financial practices suggest that rather than a 
necessary quality of debt, tradeability is historically contingent. 
 
This article examines commodification of private debt, i.e. debt owed by private actors. As a 
working definition, commodification of debt is understood as transformation of debt into a tradeable 
asset, or a more easily tradeable one. That transformation is a historical but in important respects 
still ongoing process. The article focuses on the legal aspects of the process, recognising that its 
most significant developments so far have been caused or enabled by changes in the law, which 
justifies speaking of law-based commodification. Accordingly, the article traces changes in debt as 
a legal institution, and resulting changes in the economic and social functions of debt.5 
 
Of course, commodification is not a new concept;6 nor indeed is commodification of debt. The 
above working definition of commodification of debt may differ from earlier definitions in at least 
two respects: First, the working definition implies a long historical perspective.7 This is necessary 
because developments significant to the article span over two millennia.8 Second, the working 
definition is intended, to the extent that this is possible, to be free from pre-existing theoretical 
assumptions on the nature and implications of the developments examined here.9 Thus, the degree 
                                                             
3 See A. Turner, The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (Financial Services Authority, 
United Kingdom, 2009), at 14–20, available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf; M. Blyth, 
Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford University Press, 2013), at 21–31, 84–87. 
4 See G.A. Epstein, ‘Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy’, in G.A. Epstein (ed.), Financialization 
and the World Economy (Edward Elgar, 2005), 3–16, at 3. Epstein defines financialisation as ‘the increasing role of 
financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies’. 
5 For a general call for this kind of research, see R. Swedberg, ‘On Legal Institutions and Their Role in the Economy’, 
in F. Dobbin (ed.), The Sociology of the Economy (Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), 74–92, at 74–75. 
6 See U. Salam, ‘Commodification, capitalism and crisis’, in B. Harriss-White and J. Heyer (eds.), Indian Capitalism in 
Development (Routledge, 2015), 153–169 at 153. Salam defines commodification as ‘the process by which a thing or 
activity is transformed into a commodity for the purposes of exchange in a market’ and notes that it ‘has always been at 
the heart of the study of capitalist development’. 
7 Cf. V. Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue in a World of Debt’, (2008) Journal of Business Law 756–777, at 756–764. Finch 
does not actually define ‘commodification of debt’, but uses the term in connection with various late 20th and early 21st 
century developments of financial capitalism, especially those resulting in the 2007–2008 credit crunch. 
8 For a similar temporal perspective, with the aim of providing ‘a history of the present’, see S. Frerichs and T. 
Juutilainen, ‘Rome Under Seven Hills? An Archaeology of European Private Law’, in S. Börner and M. Eigmüller 
(eds.), European Integration, Processes of Change and the National Experience (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 73–99, at 
74. 
9 Cf. S. Soederberg, ‘Student Loans, Debtfare and the Commodification of Debt: The Politics of Securitization and the 
Displacement of Risk’, (2014) 40 Critical Sociology 689–709, at 691. From a historical-materialist perspective, 
Soederberg perceives commodification of debt as ‘a tension-ridden, class-based strategy that emerges from the 
contradictions inherent to the credit system within the wider dynamics of capital accumulation’, and as involving 
processes underpinned by ‘highly unequal and exploitative social relations of power’. Further, she argues that ‘the 
neoliberal state’, by its ideology and institutions, mediates, depoliticises and legitimates ‘the displacement of social risk 
that occurs through the commodification of debt’. 
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of commodification of debt at a given time simply equals the degree of tradeability of debt, 
although the closer content of tradeability is a complex matter as this varies over time. 
 
In the following, commodification of private debt is discussed in three main sections, II to IV. 
Section II puts together historical material for further analysis in the subsequent sections, from 
Roman law up until contemporary law. Early and classical Roman law is presented as a zero point 
in the commodification of debt, due to its extremely person-bound understanding of obligations. 
This is followed by a series of historical points in which changes in the law gradually enabled and 
facilitated trading in debt. Since such an account could never be complete, the aim is to collect 
representative instances, in snapshot style. 
 
Section III draws on the historical material, distinguishing three discrete but overlapping modes in 
which commodification of private debt may occur. These are termed propertification, 
impersonalisation and risk abstraction. It is argued that each of these modes represents a qualitative 
change in debt as a legal institution. Additionally, quantitative changes should be observed because 
each mode may have advanced more or less by a given time. The modes also open avenues for 
discussion of changes in the economic and social functions of debt, and of the broader effects of 
those changes. In this sense, the modes arguably unveil parts of the ‘hidden social theory’ of laws 
on debt relations, i.e. the often unarticulated background assumptions of those laws on the nature of 
debt as a social relationship.10 
 
Section IV shows that commodification of private debt is not just a phenomenon of the past, but 
something that is very much with us, and likely to remain so in the future. Accordingly, it should be 
factored in by lawmakers. To be sure, commodification cannot be regarded as complete with respect 
to any of the three modes mentioned above. Decisions on future law may affect commodification of 
debt, advances and retreats being equally possible as to each of the modes. In other words, the 
course of commodification, or de-commodification for that matter, is indeterminate but to a degree 
could be steered if not controlled by law. Importantly, the three modes help to recognise 
opportunities and risks in future law-making. These points are illustrated by two actions included in 
the Commission’s Capital Markets Union project, namely attempts to solve cross-border problems 
with respect to assignment of claims and to revive the European securitisation market.11 Section V 
presents conclusions. 
 
 
II Past: Instances of Commodification So Far 
 
A Roman law 
 
                                                             
10 On the notion of ‘hidden social theory’, see K. Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas: The Tension Between Reason and Will in 
Law (Ashgate, 2011), at 200. Tuori discusses this notion as one of the constitutive elements of legal theories, as ‘the 
conception of social relationships under regulation which the legal theory implies (the theory’s factual commitments)’. 
11 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM(2015) 468 
final, 30 September 2015, at 21–23, available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital-markets-union/docs/building-cmu-
action-plan_en.pdf. 
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In striking contrast to laws enabling current commercial and financial practices, early and classical 
Roman law regarded transfer (‘cession’) of claims as unthinkable. A metaphysical and a functional 
explanation can be given for that unthinkability. The metaphysical explanation concerns how the 
nature of obligation was understood, namely as ‘something highly personal, a vinculum iuris that 
attains its individuality by virtue of having been created between two specific parties’. Accordingly, 
claims were thought to be inseparable from the one particular creditor–debtor relationship.12 As a 
consequence, ‘transfer’ (an intentional anachronism for the purpose of presentation) of a claim 
could not have resulted in the same claim being established between a new creditor (‘transferee’) 
and the debtor. The functional explanation recalls that back then ‘execution on the person of the 
debtor [was] a living institution’. Therefore, the law could not ‘allow a creditor to transfer his right 
to another without the consent of the debtor, thereby perhaps substituting a harsh creditor for a mild 
one’.13 
 
Rome was no exception to the rule that ‘each society in which commerce plays a role sooner or later 
has to face a strong demand to increase the circulation of credit’.14 Roman law managed to do 
without transfer of claims by making use of two other legal institutions with partly similar results, 
namely novation and procedural representation. Novation meant authorising the debtor to assume a 
new obligation with the same content towards a new creditor. The arrangement was impractical, 
among other things because it depended on the debtor’s cooperation. In procedural representation, 
the initial creditor appointed the ‘transferee’ as his cognitor (i.e. attorney) or procurator (i.e. agent) 
in rem suam (i.e. acting in his own interest), thus authorising the ‘transferee’ ‘to sue the debtor in 
his own name and to keep whatever he received’. This left the ‘transferee’ in a precarious position 
because the initial creditor, who remained the actual creditor, could still frustrate the arrangement, 
say, by instituting a claim himself, by accepting performance from the debtor or by releasing the 
debtor from the obligation. Further, the initial creditor could revoke the ‘transferee’s’ authority to 
sue. Such acts by the initial creditor were possible until the start of a suit, the litis contestatio, where 
the new creditor replaced the initial creditor (the so-called novatio necessaria). To some extent, 
though, the ‘transferee’s’ position could be ameliorated through a cautio, whereby the initial 
creditor stipulated not to interfere with it.15 
 
Under imperial law, from Antoninus Pius onwards, the ‘transferee’s’ position (as cognitor or 
procurator in rem suam) was gradually strengthened, i.e. made increasingly independent of the 
initial creditor, by the grant of an actio utilis (‘adapted action’) against the debtor in various 
situations. Eventually these actions were made available whenever a transfer of a claim had been 
intended by the parties, irrespective of the type of transaction involved.16 Development of 
                                                             
12 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (Oxford University Press, 
1996), at 58–59. On cognitor and procurator, see H.J. Roby, Roman Private Law in the Times of Cicero and of the 
Antonines, vol. II (Cambridge University Press, 1902), at 376–381. 
13 F. Schulz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford University Press, 1961), at 628. According to Schulz, the same explanation 
held true for Hellenistic and Teutonic (including English) law. 
14 Zimmermann, n. 12 above, at 59. 
15 Ibid., at 60–62. Footnote omitted from the quoted passage. Cf. Schulz, n. 13 above, at 627. According to Schulz, all 
reliable sources speak of cognitor, while procurator is Byzantine interpolation. See K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, 
Introduction to Comparative Law, transl. T. Weir (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 1998), at 443. 
16 Zimmermann, n. 12 above, at 62. See Schulz, n. 13 above, at 31. Schulz writes: ‘Actio utilis is an action arising from 
the imitation of another action promised in the Edict. The word utilis means “accommodated”, i.e. adapted to a case not 
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denuntiatio, notification of the debtor by the ‘transferee’, further improved the ‘transferee’s’ 
position, eventually excluding the possibility of the debtor to discharge the obligation by 
performance to the initial creditor. By Justinian’s time, ‘for all practical purposes assignment as a 
transfer of the substantive right from the old to the new debtor [sic: what is meant is ‘creditor’] (i.e. 
a singular succession to obligations) had become recognized’.17 
 
 
B From Corpus Iuris Civilis and Ius Commune to National Laws 
 
Roman law was codified in the Corpus Iuris Civilis in a way that proved unfortunate for later 
interpreters. The trouble was that the various classical and post-classical phases through which 
development of the law had passed were ‘juxtaposed as existing law’. This resulted in great 
confusion in medieval legal scholarship and the ius commune. The glossators dealt with 
contradictions and conflicting sources, probably as logically as they could, by reverting to the old 
non-transferability dogma. Although the ius commune eventually ‘recognized claims as fully 
transferable items of property’, confusion and theoretical disputes continued over the centuries, 
ending up in national (or nationalising) contexts. For instance, non-transferability was still being 
defended in 19th century German scholarship, by Christian Friedrich Mühlenbruch in particular, to 
be refuted by Bernhard Windscheid and Otto Bähr.18 
 
Rudolf von Jhering seems to refer to these debates in his Begriffshimmel satire, treating the non-
transferability view and its apparent conceptual purity as follows: 
 
[Spirit, an inhabitant of the heaven of jurisprudential concepts, to author-narrator:] As you 
know, the Roman jurists only perceived cession to be a transfer in the execution, and among 
us here, there is absolutely no doubt that they were quite right. But the modern legislators and 
practitioners have made of her the thing that you see before you: the transfer of the claim 
itself. A succession in a claim—can one imagine anything more absurd? The claim isn’t a 
thing that one has. On the contrary, it is a quality that is. […] How in the world should one 
suppose that this quality of being a creditor will be transferred to another? Then beauty, 
health, strength, and understanding must also be transferable, which would certainly be very 
desirable but, I am sorry to say, impossible. […] If B is another person than A, then the claim 
in the person of B is another thing than in the person of A. It will be cancelled through 
redemption by the person A and can therefore only be regenerated in B by novation.19 
                                                             
covered by the original action.’ Cf. P. Birks, The Roman Law of Obligations, ed. E. Descheemaeker (Oxford University 
Press, 2014), at 214. Birks explains the term differently: ‘The spirit, higher principle or policy of the lex is called its 
utilitas, its social usefulness, its expediency. […] The “utilitas-motivated” actions were actiones utiles.’ 
17 Zimmermann, n. 12 above, at 62–63. Zimmermann reaches this conclusion taking into account the breakdown of 
classical ‘actional law’, and the declining relevance of actiones utiles, in post-classical times. 
18 Ibid., at 63–66. See Zweigert and Kötz, n. 15 above, at 444–445. One disagreement between Windscheid and Bähr 
concerned the need to notify the debtor of an assignment. Bähr’s view, according to which notification was not required 
for transfer of a claim, but a debtor who had paid to the assignor in ignorance of the assignment had a defence, was 
eventually adopted into the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. See Sections 398 and 407. 
19 R. von Jhering, ‘In the Heaven for Legal Concepts: A Fantasy’, transl. C.L. Levy, (1985) 58 Temple Law Quarterly 
799–842, at 837. The German original ‘Im juristischen Begriffshimmel: Ein Phantasiebild’ is from 1884. The quoted 
passage is from a discussion at ‘the anatomical-pathological concept collection’. 
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Early commodification of private debt took different paths in different jurisdictions. The English 
duality of common law and equity well exemplifies jurisdiction-specific structural features that 
affected development. The common law, where similarly to Roman law non-transferability was the 
starting position, developed the institution of ‘power of attorney’ with a function comparable to that 
of procurare in rem suam, i.e. authorisation to collect on the ‘chose in action’ in the creditor’s name 
and keep the proceeds.20 The courts of equity began to improve the transferee’s position in the early 
17th century, not directly opposing the old common law rule of non-transferability but in effect 
draining its content. Finally, the method of ‘statutory assignment’ was introduced by the Judicature 
Act 1873 (now in Section 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925).21 
 
In civil law jurisdictions, the legal thinking of the time when the current codification was enacted 
may still be recognisable in the content and systematic place of rules on assignment. For example, 
the French Code civil originally located assignment ‘in the law of sales, since the eighteenth-
century jurists always saw the assignor as selling the claim assigned and the assignee as buying it’ 
(see Articles 1689–1701-1).22 However, a major amendment introduced in 2016 is located in the 
general regime of obligations (Articles 1321–1326). In the Italian Codice civile of 1942, reflecting 
‘abstract’ legal thinking and concepts, assignment is found in the title on obligations in general 
(Articles 1260–1267).23 
 
While different paths all led to enabling assignment of claims, divergences in the substantive law of 
assignment grew wide between jurisdictions, and remain so today. One notable example is the 
effectiveness of an assignment against third parties, especially the assignor’s creditors or 
subsequent assignees. In some jurisdictions, an assignment is effective against third parties by 
virtue of mere agreement between the assignor and the assignee (some, typically Germanic 
jurisdictions distinguish between an underlying obligational agreement and a special in rem 
agreement to transfer the claim). In others, an additional step is required. That step may consist in, 
say, notification of the assigned debtor or registration of the assignment. Requirements for third-
party effectiveness may vary even within the same jurisdiction, depending on the type of 
assignment (e.g. outright transfers v. transfers for security purposes).24 
 
                                                             
20 Zweigert and Kötz, n. 15 above, at 443. Cf. E. McKendrick, ‘Contract: In General’, in A. Burrows (ed.), English 
Private Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2013), 481–612, at 575–576. According to McKendrick, giving effect 
to assignment was feared to ‘lead to maintenance or champerty by encouraging officious intermeddling by C [assignee] 
in litigation between A [debtor] and B [creditor]’. Among methods that the common law recognised, he mentions ‘a 
tripartite contract known as novation and acknowledgement by A to C, by which C could become entitled to enforce 
B’s claim against A’. Footnotes omitted. 
21 Zweigert and Kötz, n. 15 above, at 444, 452. For detailed accounts, see M. Bridge, Personal Property Law (Oxford 
University Press, 4th edn, 2015), at 231–260; McKendrick, n. 20 above, at 575–582. 
22 Zweigert and Kötz, n. 15 above, at 448–449. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See B. Lurger, ‘Assignment’, in J.M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, 2nd edn, 
2012), 104–119, at 107–111, 116–118; British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL), Study on the 
Question of Effectiveness of an Assignment or Subrogation of a Claim against Third Parties and the Priority of the 
Assigned or Subrogated Claim over a Right of Another Person: Final Report, at 36–39, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/report_assignment_en.pdf. 
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In the above-quoted satire, von Jhering also deals with bearer paper (i.e. a negotiable instrument 
payable to whoever is in possession of it), in the same tone as transfer of claims: 
 
[Spirit, again, to author-narrator:] But even this modern concept of cession, which makes such 
a mockery of all the principles of logic, is still outdone by the bearer paper you see here 
before you. Obligation, this pure ideal thing existing only in the legal imagination, is traded 
by itself. It is captured and imprisoned in a piece of paper—that is the most offensive thing 
that has befallen her. A thief steals your obligations! A Roman jurist would have believed you 
were a madman if you had told him this.25 
 
To be sure, development of negotiable instruments is another instance of early commodification of 
private debt. A debt incorporated in that kind of document can be transferred by transferring the 
document itself.26 The origins of negotiable instruments have been widely debated, but they 
certainly date back many centuries.27 
 
 
C Deformalisation of Assignment Laws and Financing Techniques Based on Assignment of 
Receivables 
 
From the 1980s onwards, commodification of private debt has proceeded in the shape of a 
‘deformalisation movement’ of assignment laws. This has involved ‘the abolition of formal 
requirements for the validity of assignment or the introduction of a new form of assignment with 
fewer formalities’.28 In particular, the requirement of notification of the assigned debtor has begun 
to lose ground. 
 
For example, in 1994, Belgium abolished requirements according to which the effectiveness of an 
assignment against third parties depended on notification of the debtor by a bailiff or 
acknowledgement of the assignment by the debtor in an authentic deed. Effectiveness against the 
assigned debtor still requires notification or acknowledgement, though.29 Further examples include 
the French Loi Dailly of 1981 and Code civil amendment of 2016, and the Dutch undisclosed 
(‘silent’) assignment introduced in 2004. In these cases, too, notification requirements, where 
applicable, only concern relations to the assigned debtor. The Loi Dailly enables assignment of 
business receivables (‘professional receivables’) to a credit institution by way of a single document 
                                                             
25 Von Jhering, n. 19 above, at 837. 
26 See Zweigert and Kötz, n. 15 above, at 454. See also Bridge, n. 21 above, at 233. Bridge writes: ‘When the common 
law incorporated from the law merchant jurisdiction over bills of exchange, and other negotiable instruments, it came to 
recognize exceptionally an assignment taking the particular form of a negotiation of the instrument, which has 
consequences going beyond those flowing from ordinary assignment.’ 
27 See M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, eds. G. Roth and C. Wittich, transl. E. 
Fischoff et al. (University of California Press, 1978), vol. 2, at 681–683; J.J. Rabinowitz, ‘The Origin of the Negotiable 
Promissory Note’, (1956) 104 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 927–939. 
28 A.F. Salomons, ‘Deformalisation of Assignment Law and the Position of the Debtor in European Property Law’, 
(2007) 15 European Review of Private Law 639–657, at 640. 
29 Lebon, n. 2 above, at 391–392; Salomons, n. 28 above, at 645–646. See Articles 1690–1691 of the Belgian Code 
civil. According to Lebon, notification and acceptance can be informal, but Salomons notes that a requirement of 
written form can be inferred from the travaux préparatoires. It should also be noted that notification and acceptance 
play a role in priority contests between competing assignees. 
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(acte de cession or acte de nantissement), mentioning prescribed information on the receivables 
assigned and fulfilling prescribed formalities. In 1984, this opportunity was extended to future 
receivables.30 The Code civil amendment basically abolished special requirements for third-party 
effectiveness of an assignment, but requires written form.31 The validity of a Dutch undisclosed 
assignment requires either an authentic deed or a private document registered with the tax 
authorities (a register not accessible to the public).32 
 
While deformalisation of assignment laws facilitates trading in debt generally, it also supports more 
specific developments within commodification of private debt, namely the growing significance of 
financing techniques based on assignment of receivables. Indeed, deformalisation has often been 
expressly motivated by promotion of techniques such as factoring (i.e. conversion of trade 
receivables into cash by selling them to a finance company, a factor) and, most particularly, 
securitisation (i.e. pooling together of receivables from mortgages or other loans, to be refinanced, 
typically off the originator’s balance sheet, by issuing debt securities in capital markets).33 For 
example, this motive and ‘the competitive position of the Dutch financial market’ were present in 
the parliamentary proceedings resulting in the introduction of undisclosed assignment.34 The 
clearest cases, though, are the special laws enacted in several jurisdictions on securitisation. 
Typically, those laws have abolished formalities regarding assignment of claims within their scope 
of application, so as to facilitate securitisation transactions.35 
 
Law on securitisation is of particular interest to this article. In the modern sense, securitisation 
emerged in the United States in the 1970s and in Europe about a decade later.36 As discussed in 
sections III.B–C below, securitisation and certain other financing techniques used in connection 
with it have brought wholly new aspects to commodification of private debt, especially in terms of 
distribution and magnitude of risk. Those aspects should lead one to ask at what cost the flexibility 
and profit opportunities brought by further commodification are gained. All in all, securitisation is a 
particularly good example of law-based commodification because its feasibility depends on the 
                                                             
30 Lebon, n. 2 above, at 389–391; Salomons, n. 28 above, at 644–645; E.-M. Kieninger, ‘Evaluation: a common core? 
Convergences, subsisting differences and possible ways for harmonisation’, in E.-M. Kieninger (ed.), Security Rights in 
Movable Property in European Private Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 647–673, at 649. The relevant 
provisions are currently found in Articles L. 313-23 et seq. of the Code monétaire et financier. 
31 Articles 1321 et seq. On security (nantissement) over receivables, see Articles 2355 et seq. 
32 Lebon, n. 2 above, at 392–393; Salomons, n. 28 above, at 643–644. See Article 3:94 of the Burgerlijk Wetboek. In 
fact, the new para. 3 of Article 3:94 reintroduced undisclosed assignment, for the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1992 had 
discontinued the Dutch tradition of allowing assignments on an undisclosed basis. See Flessner and Verhagen, n. 2 
above, at 26–27. 
33 Salomons, n. 28 above, at 640. For a history of factoring, see B. Bjørn, Factoring – A Comparative Analysis: The 
legal and practical implications of factoring as practised in the United States, England and Denmark (DJØF 
Publishing, 1995), at 13–28. On the origins of securitisation, see V. Kothari, Securitization: The Financial Instrument of 
the Future (John Wiley & Sons, 2006), at 108–111. 
34 F.M.J. Verstijlen, ‘General Aspects of Transfer and Creation of Property Rights including Security Rights’, in U. 
Drobnig, H.J. Snijders and E.-J. Zippro (eds.), Divergences of Property Law, an Obstacle to the Internal Market? 
(Sellier European Law Publishers, 2006), 17–35, at 24–25. 
35 Salomons, n. 28 above, at 645, 652–655. The first European jurisdiction to enact such legislation was France in 1988. 
The relevant provisions are currently found in Articles L. 214-167 et seq. of the Code monétaire et financier. Salomons 
notes that these laws appeared initially to be exclusively a Southern European phenomenon. 
36 Kothari, n. 33 above, at 109–110, 116. See N. Fligstein and A. Goldstein, ‘A Long Strange Trip: The State and 
Mortgage Securitization, 1968–2010’, in K. Knorr Cetina and A. Preda (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of 
Finance (Oxford University Press, 2014), 339–356. 
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features of a broad regulatory framework, including regulation of buyers of securitised debt (i.e. 
investors in debt securities). 
 
 
III Analysis: Modes of Commodification 
 
A Propertification 
 
The above discussed historical points expose one particularly clear mode of commodification of 
private debt. This can be called propertification because it consists in a process where debt (as 
receivables or claims) acquires characteristics typical of a private property right. No universal 
definition exists of a private property right, but Max Weber’s ideas on property as a kind of social 
relationship, and especially his notion of ‘free property’ offer a helpful starting point. For Weber, 
property belongs to ‘closed’ social relationships, i.e. relationships in which ‘participation of certain 
persons is excluded, limited, or subjected to conditions’ and ‘monopolized advantages’ are 
guaranteed in one way or another. More precisely, property involves ‘appropriation’. In Weber’s 
terms, appropriated advantages are ‘rights’, rights that can be inherited are ‘property’, and property 
that can be acquired (and disposed of) by voluntary agreement is ‘free property’.37 
 
It appears correct to equate ‘free property’ to private property rights because the latter are typically 
characterised by their erga omnes effects,38 and because property law typically deals with transfer 
as well as use of property.39 Accordingly, two standards emerge for propertification of private debt, 
namely transferability (or ‘disposability’) and after-transfer exclusiveness (or ‘closedness’). 
Transferability means that the initial creditor (transferor) is capable of passing the creditor position 
to a prospective new creditor (transferee) by way of an agreement or other disposition. After-
transfer exclusiveness means that the transferee’s creditor position is protected against anyone who 
might be able to contest it. With that protection in place, the transferor cannot cancel or frustrate the 
transfer, the debtor cannot discharge the debt by paying the transferor, and the receivables are 
beyond the reach of the transferor’s creditors and potential subsequent transferees. 
 
As the discussion in section II indicated, transferability and after-transfer exclusiveness are results 
of long and gradual development, rather than necessary qualities of debt. To be sure, a high degree 
of both transferability and after-transfer exclusiveness is required so that debt can be reliably used 
as an object of commercial and financial transactions. In this way, propertification has changed debt 
as a legal institution, developing its ‘enabling’ or ‘empowering’ side.40 Accordingly, Weber 
mentions assignment and negotiable instruments as legal institutions, part of ‘that legal state of 
                                                             
37 Weber, n. 27 above, vol 1, at 43–44. See Swedberg n. 5 above, at 78–80. 
38 S. van Erp, ‘Comparative Property Law’, in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), 1043–1070, at 1051–1052. 
39 U. Mattei, Basic Principles of Property Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Introduction (Greenwood Press, 
2000), at 99–100. Mattei writes: ‘While use justifies the economic value of a given property […] transfer is the 
mechanism through which the value (both individual and social) of property becomes concrete.’ 
40 See Swedberg, n. 5 above, at 75–76. 
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affairs which is required by advanced and completely commercial social intercourse’ and 
‘indispensable for a modern capitalistic society’.41 
 
The notion of debt as property, as such, is older, though. In opposition to the non-transferability 
dogma held by the humanists (after the glossators and the commentators), the natural lawyers 
regarded assignment as the full transfer of a right. They understood assignment ‘as the transfer of 
ownership of res incorporales and systematically juxtaposed it with the transfer of ownership of res 
corporales’, thus drawing a ‘functional parallel between transfer of ownership and assignment’.42 
Such a parallel implies recognition of the property nature of debt. 
 
 
B Impersonalisation 
 
Propertification, as defined above, goes hand in hand with standardisation of debt relations. In 
particular, transferability presupposes that obligations between persons A and B on the one hand, 
and between persons A and C on the other, can be identical or at least fundamentally similar. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the old non-transferability dogma, according to which ‘the action arising 
from the obligation hinges on the bones and entrails of the creditor and can no more be separated 
from his person than the soul from the body’.43 Further standardisation follows from law providing 
that the debtor must be able to raise the same defences against the transferee as were available 
against the transferor, and that payment to the transferor must discharge the debt if the debtor was 
unaware of the transfer.44 All in all, standardisation entails impersonalisation of debt relations in 
that the identity of the creditor is generally irrelevant to the debtor.45 In practice, the debtor often 
anticipates that the initial creditor does not intend to remain the creditor until the debt is paid. 
 
Impersonalisation through standardisation has changed debt as a legal institution in a way that is 
likely to find resonance in broader accounts of legal, economic and societal change. For example, 
consider Ferdinand Tönnies’ classic distinction between two types of social grouping, Gemeinschaft 
(community) and Gesellschaft (civil society), with ‘diametrically opposed systems of law’. In 
Gemeinschaft law, ‘people are related to each other as natural members of a whole’, whereas in 
Gesellschaft law, ‘as individuals they are entirely independent of one another and enter into 
relationships only of their own free will’. According to Tönnies, ‘property’ belongs to both systems 
of law, but manifests itself differently in their respective contexts, namely as ‘possession’ in a 
Gemeinschaft context, and as ‘wealth’ in a Gesellschaft context. For him, possession ‘is entirely one 
with the individual and bound up with him and his way of life’, whereas wealth ‘can be divided and 
                                                             
41 Weber, n. 27 above, vol. 2, at 681–682. 
42 Zimmermann, n. 12 above, at 65. Here, Zimmermann refers in particular to Christian Wolff and Joachim Georg 
Darjes. 
43 Ibid., at 58. 
44 See ibid., at 66. 
45 Impersonalisation through standardisation does not diminish the relevance of the identity of the debtor to the creditor, 
since the likelihood of payment or other recovery would generally vary between different debtors. However, use of 
security rights may have that effect to a limited extent. This is so because information on the encumbered assets 
(collateral) and enforceability of the security right substitutes for information on the debtor. See H.W. Fleisig, 
‘Economic Functions of Security in a Market Economy’, in J.J. Norton and M. Andenas (eds.), Emerging Financial 
Markets and Secured Transactions (Kluwer Law International, 1998), 15–38, at 19. 
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combined’ and ‘alienated or disposed of’.46 Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft can be kept separate 
only in theory, though. In reality, their characteristics are always mixed, while of course 
historically, shifts can be observed from characteristics of Gemeinschaft to those of Gesellschaft.47 
The shift from property as possession to property as wealth is analogous to the shift from ‘personal’ 
to ‘impersonal’ debt. Interestingly, Tönnies describes the law relating to commercial obligations of 
his time, which to him exemplified Gesellschaft law, as follows: ‘Actions and claims change hands 
like goods or coins, so that whatever is subtracted on one side is added to the other, just as in simple 
arithmetic.’48 
 
Besides impersonalisation through standardisation discussed above, yet another kind of 
impersonalisation of debt relations exists, one that is prone to produce undesirable consequences. 
This involves the diminishing relevance to the creditor of the identity and circumstances of the 
debtor. That effect is well known in the context of securitisation, more precisely in the initial phase 
of securitisation, i.e. origination of loans. There, lenders and brokers representing them may think 
that potential debtor defaults are not their problem, because the loans made will be sold to 
securitisers, and the risks passed on even further in the securitisation chain, to investors in capital 
markets. 
 
This kind of impersonalisation is worrying because it reduces lenders’ main incentive to ensure that 
borrowers are capable of repaying their loans. Worse, it may incentivise predatory lending 
practices.49 The threat is not merely theoretical. Indeed, abuses in mortgage origination were one of 
the causes of the United States subprime mortgage securities market collapse, which sparked the 
global financial crisis. In Robert J. Shiller’s words: 
 
Borrowers were given mortgages they couldn’t afford or the wrong kind of mortgages. […] 
Brokers would often talk clients into buying large homes with adjustable-rate mortgages, 
without clearly informing them that the rates would likely go up and the homes become 
unaffordable. […] The weaknesses in the mortgage origination market—and in the behaviour 
of certain market participants—reflects a genuine deficiency in the modern financial system 
and a prime site for innovative solutions.50 
 
Yet the situation is difficult to remedy by regulation because ‘[t]here remains so much in the 
process of issuing a mortgage that simply cannot be seen and policed by the government’.51 True, 
                                                             
46 F. Tönnies, Community and Civil Society, ed. J. Harris, transl. J. Harris and M. Hollis (Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 187–189. 
47 See Frerichs and Juutilainen, n. 8 above, at 95–96. 
48 Tönnies, n. 46 above, at 187. 
49 See T. Wilson, ‘The Responsible Lending Response’, in T. Wilson (ed.), International Responses to Issues of Credit 
and Over-indebtedness in the Wake of Crisis (Ashgate, 2013), 109–131, at 121–122. 
50 R.J. Shiller, Finance and the Good Society (Princeton University Press, 2012), at 51. Shiller notes the delicateness of 
mortgage origination due to the typical imbalance between ‘the least financially informed party, the future 
homeowner(s), and sophisticated professional financial representatives’. He does not, at least explicitly, take sides in the 
debate whether securitisation and the so-called originate-to-distribute model actually lowered lending standards. On that 
debate, see O. Akseli, ‘Securitisation, the Financial Crisis and the Need for Effective Risk Retention’, (2013) 14 
European Business Organization Law Review 1–27, at 6–7. 
51 Shiller, n. 50 above, at 51. 
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any solution focusing merely on the loan origination phase will be insufficient. Therefore, 
incentives present in that phase should be controlled by dealing with the securitisation chain in its 
entirety. 
 
 
C Risk Abstraction 
 
A third mode of commodification of private debt, risk abstraction, like certain aspects of 
impersonalisation discussed above, is found in the securitisation chain. This concerns creation of 
financial products to be sold to investors in capital markets. Creation of financial products involves 
detachment of risk from actual debt relations, combination and other manipulation of those risks, 
and ‘packaging’ them into securities. Risk abstraction manifests itself even with the simplest 
residential mortgage backed securities (RMBSs). Accordingly, trade in RMBSs enables ‘the 
extension of social relations across time and space’, promising ‘the transformation of the residential 
mortgage—a spatially fixed, messy, and illiquid commodity—into a tradeable, mobile, and liquid 
financial asset’.52 
 
Risk abstraction has dramatically increased through further financial innovation and ever more 
engineered financial products, including collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default 
swaps (CDSs). In the mortgage securitisation context, CDOs may involve combining in the same 
debt security mortgage payments of many items of real estate located in many places, but separate 
in the security different ‘tranches’ with different risk and return profiles to cater for different 
investor appetites. CDSs are derivatives and, in effect, tradeable insurance policies against default 
of a designated security, such as a CDO.53 In the United States, the complexity of financial products 
grew vastly in the years preceding the credit crunch of 2007–2008, while the quality of mortgages 
securitised deteriorated. 
 
Like impersonalisation, risk abstraction is partly worrying. In the case of risk abstraction, this is due 
to systemic risk, i.e. the possibility of systemic collapse. Adair Turner discusses some of the causes 
of the United States subprime mortgage securities market collapse as follows: 
 
[T]he financial innovations of structured credit resulted in the creation of products – e.g. the 
lower credit tranches of CDOs or even more so of CDO-squareds – which had very high and 
imperfectly understood embedded leverage, creating positions in the trading books of banks 
which were hugely vulnerable to shifts in confidence and liquidity.54 
                                                             
52 S. French and A. Leyshon, ‘Dead Pledges: Mortgaging Time and Space’, in K. Knorr Cetina and A. Preda (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Finance (Oxford University Press, 2014), 357–375, at 372. French and Leyshon 
refer to ‘risk abstraction’ in the same context but in a somewhat broader sense (at 367). 
53 For a fuller yet succinct account of CDOs and CDSs, see Blyth, n. 3 above, at 28–29. 
54 Turner, n. 3 above, at 20. Turner also notes that ‘[t]o an increasing extent, credit securitised and taken off one bank’s 
balance sheet, was not simply sold through to an end investor, but: bought by the propriety trading desk of another 
bank; and/or sold by the first bank but with part of the risk retained via the use of credit derivatives; and/or 
“resecuritised” into increasingly complex and opaque instruments (e.g. CDOs and CDO-squareds); and/or used as 
collateral to raise short-term liquidity’ (at 16, bullet points omitted). See Blyth, n. 3 above, at 29–31. Blyth explains 
how CDOs that were meant to eliminate the correlation between assets ended up creating it, and how CDSs that were 
meant to insure against correlation risks ended up amplifying the problem in a way that resulted in systemic collapse. 
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In a Polanyian perspective, arguably, risk abstraction involves disembedding of debt relations.55 
Indeed, the personal, social, political and perhaps even religious ‘bonds’ inherent in or affecting a 
debt relation will mostly not follow when the risk of that debt relation is abstracted into a financial 
product. Further, the global financial crisis has shown the destructive capacity of risk abstraction. 
Then again, regulation may be seen as a way to re-embed debt relations. 
 
 
IV Future: Incompleteness and Indeterminate Course of Commodification 
 
A Cross-Border Assignment of Claims 
 
Commodification of private debt cannot be regarded as complete in terms of any of the three modes 
discussed above. The course of commodification is indeterminate, but to some degree steerable by 
future law-making. One illustration to that effect concerns cross-border assignments of claims in the 
European Union. Its gist is that propertification is underdeveloped in cross-border (or internal 
market) contexts, as compared to domestic (or Member State) contexts. 
 
The root cause of cross-border problems are divergences of substantive law between Member 
States. Some of these divergences were briefly discussed in sections II.B–C above, so suffice it to 
note that they often concern requirements for effectiveness of an assignment against third parties 
(other than the assigned debtor), especially the assignor’s creditors or subsequent assignees. The 
problems are greatly exacerbated by the fact that even conflict rules (i.e. private international law 
rules) on third-party effectiveness vary between Member States. Article 14 of Regulation 593/2008 
(Rome I) concerns assignment of claims but only deals with relations between the assignor and the 
assignee (para. 1) and between the assignor or the assignee and the assigned debtor (para. 2). A 
conflict rule on third-party relations was omitted from Article 14 because the negotiating Member 
States could not agree on what would be the appropriate conflict rule for that purpose.56 As a result, 
different Member States use different conflict rules on third-party relations, the main options being 
the law governing the contract of assignment, the law of the assignor’s habitual residence and the 
law governing the assigned claim.57 
 
The combined effect of divergences of substantive law and conflict rules between Member States 
can be understood in terms of incomplete and insufficient propertification, particularly as lacking 
after-transfer exclusiveness. That is to say, claims often fail to function like property in cross-border 
contexts, since the effectiveness of assignments against third parties is uncertain, so that the 
assignee may lose the claim assigned. To be on the safe side, first, the parties to an assignment 
should know all jurisdictions whose courts may eventually have to adjudicate on third-party 
effectiveness. Second, the parties should fulfil the requirements for third-party effectiveness under 
                                                             
55 See F. Block, ‘Introduction’, in K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our 
Time (Beacon Press, 2001), xviii–xxxviii, at xxiii–xxix. 
56 P.M.M. van der Grinten, ‘Article 14 Rome I: A Political Perspective’, in R. Westrik and J. van der Weide (eds.), 
Party Autonomy in International Property Law (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2011), 145–163, at 154–161. 
57 See BIICL, n. 24 above, at 12–13, 19–22. 
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all substantive laws to which the conflict rules of those jurisdictions point. The problem is that it 
may be unknowable beforehand what the relevant jurisdictions are, and the number of potentially 
applicable substantive laws may grow unmanageable.58 
 
These issues are found in the Commission’s Capital Markets Union action plan,59 and it is probably 
widely thought that ‘nearly every clear cut rule whatever connecting factor it chooses is better than 
the present state of affairs’.60 Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that a common European conflict rule 
will be introduced any time soon. Besides different views among Member States, different branches 
of the financial industry appear to favour different conflict rules.61 The question arises whether it 
would, after all, be easier to unify or harmonise substantive law on assignment of claims, and thus 
avoid examining complex combinations of substantive rules and conflict rules based on different 
connecting factors.62 Either solution would advance propertification, which appears advisable for 
the reliability of commercial and financial transactions. 
 
 
B Simple, Transparent and Standardised (STS) Securitisation 
 
The global financial crisis hit the European securitisation market hard. Issuance to third-party 
investors dropped from EUR 477.6 bn in 2006 to ‘almost nothing’ in 2009.63 The current regulatory 
framework is generally thought to hold back growth of the securitisation market. The European 
financial industry considers the regulatory burden excessive, arguing that ‘the current regulatory 
treatment was calibrated to reflect the weak performance of some US securitised assets – notably, 
US sub-prime mortgages – during the financial crisis, rather than the strong performance of 
European securitisation’.64 Be that as it may, in the terminology of this article, regulation that 
constricts securitisation amounts to de-commodification of private debt. 
 
The Commission has chosen to pay heed to the financial industry. As part of the Capital Markets 
Union project, the Commission is proposing a securitisation package, including a Securitisation 
Regulation and amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation.65 Through the package, the 
                                                             
58 T. Juutilainen, ‘Coherence through Uniform Private International Law of Property’, in P. Letto-Vanamo and J. Smits 
(eds.), Coherence and Fragmentation in European Private Law (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012), 101–123, at 
108–109. 
59 Communication COM(2015) 468 final, n. 11 above, at 23, 30. 
60 E.-M. Kieninger, ‘Collateralisation of Contracts’, (2013) 9 European Review of Contract Law 430–454, at 438. 
61 T.C. Hartley, ‘Choice of Law Regarding the Voluntary Assignment of Contractual Obligations under the Rome I 
Regulation’, (2011) 60 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 29–59, at 51–52. 
62 On possible points of reference for such discussions, see Lurger, n. 24 above, at 105–107. 
63 Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), High-quality securitisation for Europe: The market at a 
crossroads (June 2014), at 14, available at http://www.afme.eu/en/reports/publications/reports/afme-high-quality-
securitisation-for-europe. AFME defines securitisation as ‘the pooling together of cash-generating assets, such as 
mortgages, auto loans or SME loans, created by banks and initially funded on their balance sheets, and funding these 
assets instead by issuing bonds in the capital markets’ (at 5). 
64 Ibid., at 4. 
65 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down common rules on securitisation 
and creating a European framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation and amending Directives 
2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC, 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012, COM(2015) 472 
final, 30 September 2015, available at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-472-EN-F1-
1.PDF; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 
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Commission aims, among other things, ‘[t]o revive markets on a more sustainable basis so that STS 
securitisation can act as an effective funding channel to the economy’. ‘STS’ stands for ‘simple, 
transparent and standardised’. Securitisation products fulfilling the STS criteria are regarded as 
‘safer and simpler’, and the prudential treatment concerning them would be amended accordingly 
for banks and investment firms, and later but with the same effective date for insurers (‘more risk-
sensitive provisions on regulatory capital requirements’). This is expected to make investing in STS 
securitisation products more attractive for actors established in the European Union.66 
 
A securitisation market revival, as attempted by the Commission, could be understood as re-
commodification of private debt. Thus, a crucial question is whether the Commission adequately 
deals with the worrying aspects of impersonalisation and risk abstraction pointed out in sections 
III.B–C above. Only a few preliminary observations are possible here. The proposed Securitisation 
Regulation would address those worrying aspects to some extent, possibly safeguarding the quality 
of securitised loans and making it easier for investors to analyse and understand the risks of 
securitisation products. This would be foremost due to the STS criteria themselves (Articles 6–13) 
and rules on due diligence for investors (Article 3), risk retention (Article 4) and transparency 
(Article 5). 
 
The future adequacy of the STS criteria is difficult to assess, though. One reason for this is that the 
Commission leaves open the possibility of extending the criteria in the future. In the proposed 
Securitisation Regulation, only ‘true sale’ securitisations qualify as STS, whereas synthetic 
securitisations do not. In a synthetic securitisation, ‘the credit risk related to the underlying 
exposures is transferred by means of a guarantee or derivative contract’, which ‘introduces an 
additional counterparty credit risk and potential complexity’. Nevertheless, following the work of 
international and European bodies, the Commission ‘will assess whether some synthetic 
securitisations that have performed well during the financial crisis and that are simple, transparent 
and standardised should be able to meet the STS requirements’.67 Simplicity is relative, as indeed is 
transparency. This can be read as an example of the indeterminacy of commodification of private 
debt. 
 
 
V Conclusion 
 
The overarching aim of this special issue is to unravel the European community of debt, exploring 
the diverse bonds (here, in a sociological rather than financial sense) that connect states and 
peoples, and enterprises and individuals. The emphasis is on the role of law in transnationalisation 
                                                             
575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, COM(2015) 473 final, 30 September 
2015, available at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2015/EN/1-2015-473-EN-F1-1.PDF. 
66 European Commission – Fact Sheet, A European Framework for Simple and Transparent Securitisation, 30 
September 2015, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5733_en.htm. See Proposal COM(2015) 
472 final, n. 65 above, at 15. The Commission emphasises that STS does not mean risk free, but means that a number of 
criteria are respected and ‘a prudent and diligent investor will be able to analyse the risk involved’. For analysis and 
critique, see S.L. Schwarcz, ‘Securitization and Post-Crisis Financial Regulation’, (2016) 102 Cornell Law Review 
Online 115–139, at 121–129, available at http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2016/10/SchwarczOnlineEssayfinal.pdf. 
67 Proposal COM(2015) 472 final, n. 65 above, at 15. 
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of debt relations, yet keeping in mind that communities are bound together by solidarity, so that 
transnational communities of debt presuppose transnationalisation of solidarity. This article has 
contributed to the aim by looking into bonds that private debt implies for the parties in that 
relationship and for societies at large. In particular, the article has focused on the nature of debt as a 
commodity, i.e. a tradeable asset. What justifies this focus in the context of the special issue is that 
commodification of debt is a prerequisite for circulation and large-scale transnationalisation of debt, 
and thus formation of transnational communities of debt.  
 
It would be incorrect to assume that commodification of private debt has only been about 
quantitative change, i.e. increasing volumes of trading in debt. Instead, as the brief analysis of 
historical material in this article indicates, the legal institution of debt and the economic and social 
functions of debt have significantly changed in the process. The three modes of commodification 
distinguished in the article – propertification, impersonalisation and risk abstraction – capture the 
main aspects of those changes and explain how private debt has developed into the kind of tradeable 
asset that it is today. 
 
It would be equally incorrect to assume that commodification of private debt is now complete. 
Indeed, the process is likely to continue in terms of all three modes. Importantly, as the examples of 
cross-border assignments of claims and the European securitisation market show, future law-
making in Europe is in a position to partly decide how the story of commodification will continue. 
This observation opens space for normative insights. From the viewpoint of the European 
community of debt, commodification of private debt can be both insufficient and excessive at the 
same time. This is less paradoxical than it may sound. Commodification is insufficient where debt, 
in the shape of claims or receivables, cannot be reliably used as an object of commercial and 
financial transactions. Commodification is excessive where it incentivises abuse or causes a risk of 
systemic collapse.68 
 
Future law-making in matters like these may be crucial for the self-preservation of the European 
community of debt (and of fate, and of law). Inactivity or wrong decisions, should these cumulate 
over time, may cause that community’s cohesive bonds of solidarity to falter. Insufficient 
commodification implies lost opportunities in terms of prosperity, and is likely to reduce the 
chances and the will to commit to economic activity, while excessive commodification may induce 
crises capable of putting transnational solidarity to extreme tests. 
 
                                                             
68 In general terms, this point resembles Driesen’s economic dynamic theory, which ‘focuses on the shape of change 
over time’ and ‘adopts avoidance of systemic risk while keeping open a reasonably robust set of economic opportunities 
as a minimum governmental goal’. See D.M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2012), at 5. 
